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Experimentation and Decentralization in Chinese Labor Relations 
 
 
 
 
Abstract:  
 
In this introduction to the special issue, we argue that China is taking an experimental and 
decentralized approach to the development of new labor relations frameworks. Particular 
political constraints in China prevent interest aggregation among workers, as the central 
state sees this as posing a risk to social stability. Firms and local governments have been 
given a degree of space to experiment with different arrangements, as long as the 
categorical ban on independent unions is not violated. The consequence has been an 
increasingly differentiated labor relations landscape, with significant variation by region 
and sector. We note some countervailing tendencies towards re-centralization, but 
emphasize that this phenomenon remains largely confined to the municipal level. The 
five papers in this special issue address different aspects of both experimentation and 
decentralization in labor relations.  
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 The changes in work, labour and employment relations in China that are the 
subject of this special issue must be viewed against the broader context of economic 
reform. Over the past thirty years, China’s approach to economic reform has been marked 
by a high degree of experimentation and decentralization.  As has been well established 
in the literature, China began moving away from central planning of the economy in the 
late 1970s, and allowed for a variety of initiatives with market reforms to develop in the 
provinces. This resulted in experiments with decollectivization of land (Unger, 2002), the 
emergence of market-oriented but collectively owned “town and village enterprises” 
(Naughton, 1994; Walder, 1995), fully private firms (Liu, 1992; Nee and Opper, 2012; 
Tsai, 2007), and spatially circumscribed special economic zones. If regions proved 
successful, their “models” were often promoted throughout the country. The central state 
has proven willing to relinquish quite a bit of control over local governments during this 
process, as long as such autonomy is oriented towards increasing economic growth. The 
consequence is that China’s economy has become increasingly differentiated throughout 
the reform era.  
 Our argument is that the state is taking a similarly experimental, gradualist and 
decentralized approach to reform of the system of labor relations. Perhaps there is 
nothing surprising about this. Indeed, highly differentiated labor relations institutions 
would seem to be the corollary of a highly differentiated economy. A unified approach 
would be unable to accommodate the requirements of a hugely diverse set of employment 
relations that vary widely by region, sector, workforce composition, and form of 
ownership. And yet there is a key distinction with the process of economic reform: On 
the one hand, decentralization of economic decision-making has created a space where 
private capital is meaningfully autonomous from the central state – if, importantly, 
remaining deeply integrated with local governments. Private firms (both domestic and 
foreign) as well as public firms owned by the municipality are not integrated into a 
hierarchical organization that extends all the way to Beijing.
1
 On the other hand, the All 
                                                        
1 It should be noted that many of these firms do have CCP branches. Nonetheless, 
there is little evidence to suggest that the central Party leadership is actively 
involved in shaping investment or managerial decisions within private firms.  
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China Federation of Trade Unions --the only legal representative of labor – is integrated 
into a hierarchical national organization.  The ACFTU has long been used by the state as 
an instrument of spreading party ideology and control in all workplaces. Alternative 
federations have never been allowed. The central government is keen to allow for 
experimentation in labor relations, (the ACFTU for example has been asked to organize 
all workplaces and to bargain collectively in order to contain industrial unrest), but with 
the important proviso that independent forms of worker organization are banned.  In this 
sense, labor relations reform has proceeded, but it faces greater constraints than has been 
the case with economic reform. It is within this political framework that employers, 
unions, and governments largely at the municipal level have been trying new approaches 
to regulating employment. Thus, while capital has been granted meaningful autonomy, 
labor at the local level continues to operate with constrained autonomy. The consequence 
of this asymmetric politics is that diverse efforts to rationalize employment relations have 
rarely been successful.  
 Finding a new approach to regulating employment is an increasingly pressing 
issue from the perspective of the central government. Politically, worker unrest has been 
growing for many years (Chan & Pun, 2009; Chan, 2010). Although numerous wildcat 
strikes, road blockages, and occasional riots do not yet represent a major challenge to 
political stability (Lee, 2007), the state has been unable to reduce “depoliticized” worker 
insurgency (Friedman, 2014b). Reform in employment relations is also necessary for 
economic reasons. At the level of the firm, incredibly high rates of turnover and severe 
labor shortages have come to be one of the key limits on future growth. The inability to 
pin down a stable workforce has pushed employers in the industrial centers in coastal 
areas to look further afield – either to China’s interior or overseas (Zhu and Pickles, 
2014). And at the national level, the central state has espoused the goal of economic 
rebalancing, i.e. making household consumption, rather than state driven investment, the 
key engine of economic growth. China’s household consumption as a share of GDP is 
only 38%, compared to the USA, which clocks in at 70% and is significantly less than the 
approximately 60% it is in countries such as Brazil, France, Germany and India. Such a 
rebalancing involves major policy challenges in a number of arenas, including higher 
wages and an expansion of social services, both of which are likely necessary to foster 
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increased domestic consumption (Chamon and Prasad, 2010). In other countries, 
particularly the USA, a rationalization of employment relations has played a key role in 
the movement from unregulated capitalism to a Fordist model of high consumption.  
These factors explain the central state’s granting of constrained autonomy to experiment 
with labor relations reforms.  
 Each of the papers in this special issue address different aspects of labor relations 
in China. In so doing they make important contributions to our overall argument about 
experimentation and decentralization in employment relations and regulation in China.  
We briefly introduce the papers below and later will show how each is integrated into our 
argument.  
   Gallagher, Giles, Park and Wang  (this issue) focus their article on the 
government’s efforts in the legal arena, particularly with respect to labor law. They find 
that although the government and local labor bureaus are increasingly focusing on 
enforcement of the 2008 labor contract law, there is substantial variation in actual 
enforcement across regions and across different provisions of the law.  Chung (this issue) 
in his article tries to explain why there are differences in enforcement of different legal 
provisions and regions by highlighting that successful enforcement is a function of both 
top down as well as bottom up pressure from a variety of social actors, whose interests 
diverge on different aspects of the law.  Compliance is better, he argues, when the 
interests of different actors converge.  The variation in enforcement is one significant 
aspect of the decentralization that is one of the core arguments of this paper.   Frenkel and 
Yu (this issue) highlights just how young workers are increasingly aware of their legal 
rights, and hence constitute some pressure for better enforcement, but also to increased 
labor unrest.  In the absence of an effective labor relations framework, managers have 
been taking matters into their own hands. Although representing very different sorts of 
approaches, both the “humanized management” discussed in Choi and Peng’s article and 
the unfree labor of student interns in Smith and Chan’s contribution are unilateral 
responses by management to ongoing instability. It is notable that none of our 
contributions pay significant attention to the trade union or recent collective bargaining 
initiatives, which is a key part of our argument. Although there have been some important 
developments in this realm, most scholars remain pessimistic about the capacity of the 
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ACFTU given its fundamental weakness. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that different 
models of trade union activity have proliferated around the country, and there is certainly 
important diversity.  
 Below, we outline the diversity of reforms that employers, unions, local 
governments, and civil society actors are pursuing in contemporary China. After a brief 
overview of the primary sources of employment instability in China, we will proceed to 
analyze three spheres of reform:  1)  legal; 2) unions & collective bargaining; and 3) 
managerial strategy. In each section we will draw on the papers in this special issue.  
  
Labour Market Instability 
 
 The Chinese labour market, characterized by significant oversupply during the 
1990s, is currently witnessing unprecedented instability, with acute labor shortages, 
rising industrial conflict and high levels of turnover.  
 
Labour Shortages 
 
 A key change during the decade of the 2000s has been the transition from a labor 
surplus economy to one dominated by labor shortages (Golley and Meng, 2011). As the 
market economy expanded in the 1980s, private employers in coastal regions enjoyed a 
seemingly limitless supply of low-cost migrant labor. However by the late 2000s, it 
became clear that a structural shift in the labor market was underway. As early as 2004, 
employers along the coast had begun to report shortages. Although 20 million migrants in 
the export-processing sector were thrown out of work by the economic crisis in 2008, 
tight labor markets re-emerged almost immediately thereafter. The emergence of labor 
shortages in rapidly growing inland regions provides further evidence that a structural 
shift is underway.
2
   
                                                        
2 For example, Sichuan province, historically a labor exporting province, reported 
1.5 positions for every job seeker following Chinese New Year, 2014. See: February 
13, 2014. “yonggonghuang cong yanhai xiang neidi manyan, zhaogong qiuzhi 
liangnan quyu changtai.” Zhong Xin She.  
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 A number of reasons have been advanced for this labor scarcity. First and 
obviously, shortages are a function of the rapid growth of the Chinese economy.  But, 
arguably the seeds of the shortage were planted much earlier by China’s birth control 
policy, which has reduced the number of people entering the labor market.  In addition, 
there has been a major expansion of tertiary education so more young people are 
choosing to go to college rather than factories. Ma and Adams (2013) note that the 
number of people enrolling in higher education programs increased from 2.2 million in 
2000 to over 6.6 million in 2010.   A further explanation is the stated preference of 
employers for young migrant workers rather than older ones (Ma and Adams, 2013).  
An important cause of the labour shortage is reflected in the differences between 
the younger generation of rural migrant workers, and earlier generations. Young migrant 
workers are not only better educated, have hardly worked on the farm, and are no longer 
satisfied with low level jobs, but are also motivated more by their own career 
advancement and individual interests, whereas their forbears were content to work in a 
state owned facility under the “iron rice bowl” system of employment. What’s more, they 
put a premium on social justice and fair treatment, which the Chinese government's 
extensive legislative changes that protect and increase workers rights (described below) 
have facilitated to no small extent.  As such, when confronted with the sweatshop 
conditions of standard factory work, this new generation tends to "vote with their feet", or 
they are more inclined to raise disputes or engage in strike activity.   In this volume 
Frenkel and Yu persuasively argue that the new generation of migrant workers can no 
longer be described as members of an "underclass" and are not significantly different in 
their work orientation and strategies for work-life improvement than regular workers.  
 Yet another reason for the labor shortage has been the institutionalized 
discrimination against migrant workers as a result of the hukou system (the system of 
household registration originally introduced by the Communist Party in 1958 to regulate 
movement of people between rural and urban areas).   Given that migrant workers who 
work outside their hukou area do not automatically qualify for a range of benefits, they 
are less likely to work in the cities, and more likely to seek work in their home provinces. 
This is especially true given recent reforms to agriculture that provide an incentive to 
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move back (Zhan and Huang, 2013), as well as the movement of employers from the 
coastal cities to more inland locations in search of cheap and less scarce labour.  
 The net impact of this demographic shift from labor surplus to labor scarcity is a 
steady decline in China's working age population.  According to the Chinese National 
Bureau of Statistics, the working age population was 972 million in 2012, a decrease of 
3.45 million over the previous year. And it is predicted that this number will decline to 
870 million by 2050.  The core group of industrial workers, (ages 25-39), born during the 
middle of the one child policy, will reduce even more rapidly. Dass and Diaye (2013) 
estimate that China's excess supply of labor peaked in 2010 (after the financial crisis) and 
has declined rapidly since then, suggesting that China will reach the Lewisian turning 
point by 2020 (Das and N’Diaye, 2013).  
But in the short run, as Gallagher (2012) argues, the labour shortage has created 
volatility in the labor market, and enlarged the economic and political space for Chinese 
workers. One the one hand, it has increased their bargaining power, and workers have 
increasingly resorted to strikes and protests. On the other hand, workers are more likely 
to move from company to company in search of better wages and working conditions, 
resulting in high attrition. And rising worker protests have motivated the state to enact 
more protective labor legislation. We turn to these two issues in turn.  
 
Attrition 
 
 The labour shortage is reflected in increased attrition, as workers use "exit" in the 
absence of adequate "voice" mechanisms.  Although turnover rates vary across different 
sectors and industries, the average national turnover rate is about 20% (Wong, 2011). The 
range is much larger however.  
 Voluntary attrition has a number of causes.   Job induced physical stress and 
injuries are a significant reason why people leave their jobs, and the working conditions 
and long hours at China's sweatshops are well documented in the literature.  Mandatory 
overtime has also been cited as a reason for turnover, although migrant workers are 
frequently willing to work overtime given the low base wages and lack of alternative 
ways to spend time in factory dormitories.  As the effects of the labor shortage are felt, 
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manufacturers are increasingly demanding excessive overtime hours to meet production 
targets, which workers are increasingly refusing. In addition to long hours, low wages 
and wage arrears are also significant drivers of turnover.  Although minimum wages have 
risen steadily since 2004, many employers have not been paying the minimum stipulated 
in provincial legislation and the problem of unpaid wages continues. Dangerous or 
unhealthy working conditions, the poor quality of factory dormitories and meals, the high 
rents of factory subsidized housing, further spur workers to vote with their feet.  Many 
authors (e.g., Elfstrom and Kuruvilla, 2014) highlight increased worker intolerance of the 
autocratic and "militaristic" management practices of Chinese manufacturing, the need 
for better treatment and respect from management. The institutionalized discrimination 
against migrant workers via the hukou is also a key cause of attrition. The inability to get 
benefits at their place of employment means that workers who wish to have a family are 
often forced to return to the village. Also, workers with rural hukou are more likely to be 
employed as temporary workers.  
 The high levels of worker turnover in China are clearly exacerbated by the labor 
shortage. Workers are aware that alternative employment opportunities are abundant and 
are willing to use exit for even minor changes in working conditions and wages. Clearly, 
attrition is a key issue for employers. In a survey of manufacturers from Shanghai, 34% 
cite poor employee retention as the top issue in 2007 and 2008. Elfstrom and Kuruvilla 
(2014) report an interview from an apparel manufacturer who notes “turnover has 
increased to 20% from zero ‘back in the day’.”   The instability caused by such high 
levels of turnover can be quite disastrous for employers. Okudera
3
 (2011) reported an 
unexceptional experience from the Pearl River Delta:  
 "At an electronic parts factory in Dongguan, Guangdong province, operated by a 
Japanese company, more than half of the workers quit within six months. The factory has 
to hire about 400 new workers every month to maintain a workforce of 4,200" 
 Thus, labor shortages and attrition cause substantial labour market instability.  But 
instability is also increased by labor unrest, to which we turn to next.  
                                                        
3 https://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/china/AJ2011091811081     September 19 
2011, Atsushi Okudera 
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Industrial Conflict 
 Industrial conflict has been rising. So-called “mass incidents” (public protests 
about a variety of issues including labor issues, typically involving processions and  
roadblocks as well as strikes ) have risen steadily from 9000 in 1994 to 87000 in 2005, 
the last time the government released such figures. The government does not publish 
statistics about employment related strikes. Most current estimates are drawn from news 
reports or independent reports by activists and so forth, and hence are not completely 
reliable.  But they are indicative. Elfstrom and Kuruvilla (2014) report 435 industrial 
actions between January 2008 and March 31 2012.  They find that strikes and protests by 
workers are distributed throughout China, that there have been several well publicized 
strike "waves" that suggest some degree of coordination, and that strikes are more 
common at foreign owned companies. Given their method of data collection, their 
estimates of the numbers of strikes are at best a gross under-estimate of the true picture. 
Their data however is consistent with data reported by the China Labour Bulletin (a Hong 
Kong based NGO).   
Elfstrom and Kuruvilla argue that there has been a change in the causes of strikes 
in China. While prior literature noted that strikes were largely "defensive" in nature, (to 
uphold existing rights and benefits), they find that strikes are increasingly "offensive" i.e. 
for improvements in pay, working conditions, and increased respect in the workplace.  
For example, 102 out of 435 strikes were for increased wages and benefits. The huge 
strike at Yue Yuen in April 2014 indicates that migrant workers have moved beyond 
simple wage demands and are increasingly concerned with social insurance (including 
pensions). This is a significant departure from just a few years ago.  
It is important to put worker strikes in a larger context, i.e. they are part of a 
general increase in worker militancy and wider variation in worker tactics.  Thus, 
workers use "exit" as opposed to "voice", and engage in every day acts of resistance such 
as "shirking" or "holding back", as well as increased aggression and violence. Workers 
continue to take advantage of legal options through the dispute settlement process, and 
particularly in the Pearl River Delta, they increasingly rely on emergent institutions such 
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as labor NGOs. In contrast to Lee's characterization of early Chinese protests as being 
strikes of desperation (by state owned workers who have lost their jobs) and protests of 
discrimination (by migrant workers who work under sweatshop conditions without 
benefits), Elfstrom and Kuruvilla suggest that the current generation of strikes indicate 
that worker are using their improved bargaining position to go on the offensive.   
 Why has worker militancy increased? Certainly pervasive labor shortages have 
increased workers’ leverage, and workers are now more aware of their rights. While local 
governments continue to view strikes with hostility and frequently resort to coercion, 
higher levels of the state may be somewhat more supportive. Rising wages and increased 
domestic consumption is in line with the central government’s wishes to “rebalance” the 
economy, so they may provide tacit support (e.g. by allowing media coverage to 
continue) if workers can capture their attention. Finally, there may be a learning process 
at work in which younger workers see that striking is the most effective way to have their 
grievances addressed.  
Legal Experiments 
 In this context of labor shortages, rising expectations of migrant workers and 
increased disputes, strikes and protests, the Chinese state has enacted several new laws 
that seek to strengthen individual worker rights, enhance employment security, reduce 
informal employment, and widen access to social insurance.  A number of new laws have 
been put in place since 2008, including the Labor Contract Law (2008), the Labour 
Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law (2008), the Employment Promotion Law (2008) 
and the Social Insurance Law (2011).   Gallagher, Giles, Park and Wang (this issue) 
describe the various provisions of the laws, and argue that China's labour regulations 
would now rank third amongst the OECD countries in terms of Employment Protection 
Legislation "strictness". What is notable about these legislative efforts is that, by and 
large, they endow workers with an increasing array of individual rights in the absence of 
collective rights – necessarily implying a high degree of decentralization in 
implementation.  
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 Gallagher et al argue that these laws have improved several aspects of 
employment relations in China. They document a significant increase in formal 
employment, with more workers now having written contracts, although there is variation 
across provinces and between urban and migrant workers.  Increased formality in 
employment has also increased access to social insurance generally, although access 
remains a major problem for migrant workers.  Whereas pension insurance coverage for 
urban workers increased to 88.5%, it was only 22.2% for migrant workers. This, they 
argue is largely due to the hukou policy, i.e. migrant workers themselves do not wish to 
participate in social insurance schemes from which they themselves will not benefit, 
given concerns about portability. However, the recent Yue Yuen strike suggests that there 
are a significant number of employers that are reluctant to provide social insurance even 
if migrant workers demand it.     
 Yet, despite the positive impact the law has had for some workers, there is major 
variation across region and sector, and widespread violations remain. Enforcement is 
highly decentralized, and local administrations have re-written or passed regulations, a 
process Kuruvilla, Lee, and Gallagher (2011) term "loopholization", in order to attract 
foreign investment and enhance local competitiveness. Employers have evaded the law 
through the use of labor dispatch agencies i.e., through labour subcontracting.  Although 
the government has recently revised the labor contract law to close this loophole via 
restricting the use of "dispatched” or "agency" labor to only 10% of the workforce, it is 
likely that compliance will continue to be uneven.  
 There are some areas in which enforcement has been somewhat more effective. 
Chung (this issue) points to the importance of non-state actors such as labor NGOs, legal 
aid centers, and other social organizations in the enforcement of labor law.  His argument 
is that a bottom-up approach to labor law enforcement, with workers and non-state actors 
working together is more effective than the traditional top down method. But if NGOs are 
a key actor in the multi-stakeholder approach that he identifies, there will continue to be 
major geographic unevenness. NGOs are highly concentrated in the Pearl River Delta, 
with a smaller number in the Yangzi River Delta and Beijing. Such a bottom-up approach 
to enforcement is necessarily highly decentralized, as labor NGOs are subject to 
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extremely constrained autonomy and are not allowed to organize nationally (Franceschini, 
2014). To the extent that civil society plays a role in setting labor standards, we will 
likely see increased diversification of conditions. 
Although much attention has focused on national level laws, provinces and 
municipalities have also been experimenting with a variety of arrangements. As was the 
case with marketization in the 1970s and 80s, Guangdong province has been the most 
experimental. While the province has yet to enact fundamental collective negotiation 
reform, two major pieces of legislation have been drafted since 2008. The “Regulations 
on Democratic Management” were first drafted in 2008, then shelved as a result of the 
economic crisis, and finally resuscitated in the wake of a major strike wave in the 
summer of 2010. The regulations would have created a system for workers to demand 
collective negotiations and to elect their own representatives. However, after facing fierce 
resistance from the Hong Kong Chamber of Commerce, the draft regulations were once 
again shelved. In late 2013, Guangdong proposed a somewhat different legal framework 
for collective negotiations. This time, however, the conditions were less favorable to 
workers. Labor NGOs and scholars were almost unanimously opposed to the draft 
regulations, as many feared it would result in criminalization of strike activity that had 
become somewhat tolerated. Employers too, expressed opposition out of concern that 
employees would put forth excessive demands in collective negotiations. At the time of 
writing, the fate of the draft regulations is still unclear.   
Given that Guangdong has experienced severe instability in labor relations, it is 
likely that the province will continue experimenting with institutional responses. While 
the central government has been tolerant, it seems unlikely that they will be able to 
contain basic rights such as collective bargaining and legal strikes to specific provinces in 
the long term given the high mobility of migrant workers.   
    
Collective Bargaining Experiments 
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 In recent years, trade unions have made major efforts to move beyond a strictly 
welfarist function (Yang, 2013) to try to represent workers in collective negotiations. As 
collective negotiation has received greater support from the central state and national 
union leadership, there has been a continuous effort to ensure a high level of 
decentralization. The ACFTU has consciously undermined the power of the nationally 
organized industrial unions in favor of regionally based federations. Since industrial 
unions do not mirror the Party structure, the fear is that if given greater leeway in 
representing workers, they could serve as a potential independent base of political power 
and would therefore threaten stability. Thus, most experimentation with collective 
negotiation has been at the firm level. Increased experimentation with sectoral bargaining 
has emerged, but it has been almost entirely restricted to the municipal level (see below 
for a notable exception). And negotiations have been largely restricted to wages, with 
issues such as benefits, hours, seniority structures, workplace rules, and other topics still 
determined unilaterally by management.   
 As with all economic endeavors in China, local governments have played a major 
role in promoting collective negotiation. While in many places this has been restricted to 
clichéd rhetoric about “harmonious labor relations,” some governments have been more 
active. One recent example comes from the Binhai New District in Tianjin, where the 
district government has provided material incentives to private firms. Since 2011, firms 
have been able to receive a subsidy equivalent to 15% of the total increase in wage bill 
that comes about through collective negotiation.
4
 The government has provided subsidies 
to more than 1000 firms employing nearly 300,000 workers. While this approach is still 
exceptional, it suggests a possible alternative for local governments looking to raise 
wages outside of the crude lever of minimum wage regulations.  
 Frequently the most effective collective negotiations come as an ad-hoc response 
to wildcat strikes. As is well known, there are no independent unions or right to strike in 
China, so management frequently has little incentive to take negotiations seriously. But in 
the wake of autonomous worker-led strikes, these dynamics change, and the union often 
                                                        
4 September 24, 2013. “tianjin binhai xin qu yi jili jizhi tuijin gongzi xieshang, 
zhigong zhang gongzi qiye ke huo zhengfu butie.” [Tianjin Binhai new district uses 
incentive system to promote collective negotiation, firms can receive government 
subsidies for worker wage increase] Gongren Ribao.  
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intervenes as an intermediary to negotiate a settlement (Chen, 2010). This was 
particularly apparent during the major strike wave in the auto industry in 2010 (Butollo 
and ten Brink, 2012). Although serious concerns remain about the sustainability of 
bargaining arrangements, there was greater space for successive rounds of wage 
negotiations in some of the firms that experienced strikes, particularly the heavily 
publicized Nanhai Honda plant (Chan and Hui, 2012; Friedman, 2013). Given that there 
is no right to strike in China, this approach to collective negotiation will necessarily 
remain reactive, ad-hoc, and highly localized.  
 Although decentralization has been the unmistakable trend over the past thirty 
years, recently there have been some countervailing tendencies towards a modest degree 
centralization. This has been particularly apparent in the sanitation industry in 
Guangzhou, which after being radically marketized and decentralized after WTO entry in 
2001 experienced ongoing strike waves (Friedman, 2014a). Another highly publicized 
effort in Wuhan led to city-wide bargaining in the food and beverage industry, and the 
final agreement claimed to cover 450,000 employees. Even more surprising, in early 
2014 the Financial, Commercial, Light Industry, Textile and Tobacco Workers’ Union, 
China Cuisine Association, and China Hotel Association announced they had 
successfully negotiated the, “2014 Food and Beverage Industry Wage and Benefits 
Guidelines.” This was the first time such an agreement was reached at the national level, 
and it included guidelines for base wages, wage increases, benefits, and job training, in 
theory covering 22 million employees.
5
 With enforcement tenuous to non-existent, it is 
certain that these guidelines are of little consequence for most of China’s food and 
beverage workers. Nonetheless, the guidelines represent an important political 
development and perhaps recognition of the limits of decentralization. It is also worth 
emphasizing that this agreement remains highly exceptional, and nearly all efforts with 
sectoral bargaining continue to appear at the municipal level.  
 
Managerial experiments 
                                                        
5 January 28, 2014. “wo guo shou ge hangye niandu gongzi fuli zhidao yijian 
gongbu.” [China’s first annual industrial wage and benefits guidelines announced] 
Gongren Ribao.  
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 HRM has changed dramatically in China over the past thirty years – and even in 
the past five. From the 1950s until the 1980s, employment in SOEs was characterized by 
the “iron rice bowl” of lifetime employment. Managerial actions were explicitly 
politicized, and while there was essentially no labor market, enterprise cadres maintained 
a great deal of unchecked authority over their employees (Walder, 1983). The basic 
features of this system were unchanged in the early phases of reform (during the 1980s), 
but were now joined by alternative approaches in the burgeoning private sector. Foreign-
owned firms in the special economic zones of the southeast were characterized by a 
lawless environment and coercive management practices (Chan, 2001). In the small 
domestically owned private firms of Zhejiang, on the other hand, a roughly egalitarian 
collectivist approach predominated (Chen, 2008), and there was little differentiation 
between management and employees (indeed, workers were often drawn from extended 
kin networks). Only one decade into the reform process, China’s managerial landscape 
had already become highly diversified.  
 More recently, managers have been using a variety of strategies to respond to the 
challenges posed by high turnover, labor conflicts, increased labor costs, and the 
changing legal environment. One trend that appears across various forms of ownership 
and sectors of the economy is the increased use of labor subcontracting – frequently 
referred to as “dispatch labor” in China. In large part this has been a response to the 
higher cost of dismissal imposed by the Labor Contract Law, and indeed the number of 
dispatch workers in China grew from 27 million before the law was enacted to 60 million 
in just three years.
6
 It appears as if SOEs have in fact been most aggressive in expanding 
the use of dispatch labor, with some firms relying on dispatch agencies for up to 2/3 of 
their workforce (Wang, 2012). Managers have been attracted to dispatch labor because of 
the enhanced flexibility, reduced costs, and ability to skirt regulations relating to social 
insurance, non-fixed term contracts, and severance pay. As noted above, the Ministry of 
Human Resources and Social Security recently put into effect the, “Provisional 
                                                        
6 February 25, 2011. “quanwei baogao cheng ‘laowu paiqian’ da 6000 wan ren 
quanzong jianyi xiugai ‘laodong hetongfa’.” [authoritative report claims ‘labor 
dispatch’ has reached 60 million people, ACFTU suggests revisions to Labor Contract 
Law] Jingji Guancha bao. 
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Regulations on Dispatch Labor.” Among other features, the regulations ban firms from 
hiring more than 10% of their workforce from dispatch agencies. With a two-year grace 
period, it will be of great interest to see how various types of firms respond to these 
regulations.  
 On the other hand, it has been private firms that have been more enthusiastically 
expanding their use of student or intern labor. As argued by Chris Smith and Jenny Chan 
(this issue)  this represents a new form of “constrained labor” in China. It is highly 
constrained in the sense that technical school students are frequently not given any choice 
over whether they will take an internship, where they will be placed, and they are not 
allowed to negotiate over the terms of employment. Since completion of the internship is 
required for graduation, this form of labor violates the basic principle of free labor. 
Although there are not comprehensive studies on the expansion of student labor, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that this has been particularly pervasive in light 
manufacturing. In particular, Foxconn has come under fire for its pervasive use of forced 
student labor.
7
 Student labor is a clear attempt to stabilize the migrant workforce in the 
face of massive and seemingly unsolvable labor turnover and shortage.  
 A final approach – and one that has certainly been incorporated with the above 
methods – is an attempt to construct less coercive means of management. Official trade 
unions have long advocated a paternalistic form of management, as embodied most 
clearly in the slogan of “harmonious labor relations.” But recent indications suggest that 
firms are changing their management styles of their own accord. Choi and Peng (this 
issue) argue that in their research, “humanized management” was consciously a response 
to a tightening of the labor market in the Pearl River Delta. Indicating ACFTU support 
for this approach, the official Workers Daily reported positively on the method of “using 
feelings to retain people” among small enterprises in Zhejiang province.8 Even Foxconn, 
best known for its harsh and militaristic style of management, turned to a softer approach 
following the string of worker suicides in 2010. In addition to holding rallies adorned 
                                                        
7 October 14, 2013. Chakrabortty, Aditya. “Forced student labor is central to the 
Chinese economic miracle.” The Gaurdian.  
8 February 12, 2014. “zhejiang qiye ‘yi qing liu ren’ yingdui yonggong huang” 
[Zhejiang enterprises ‘use feelings to retain people’ to respond to labor shortage]. 
Gongren Ribao.  
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with banners reading, “care for and love each other,”9 the company hired teams of mental 
health counselors. As Choi and Peng suggest in this issue, it is not clear that rhetorical 
shifts in the absence of significant material improvements will be sufficient to stabilize 
the workforce. Nonetheless, it is clear that both managers and the state have been 
promoting a variety of paternalistic approaches to HRM.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 We have argued that China is taking an experimental and decentralized approach 
to the construction of new labor relations regimes. The papers in this volume exemplify 
experiments and developments in China.  Although there have been a number of 
important national-level legislative reforms, the state has largely prevented the 
emergence of any regional – let alone national – efforts. As a result, much of the action 
has taken place at the municipal or enterprise level. Despite the admiration with which 
Chinese unionists frequently speak of Northern European-style centralized bargaining, in 
practice they have pursued a highly decentralized approach. “Experimental” here refers to 
the fact that the central state has been tolerant of regional unions and employers trying 
out a variety of different approaches to stabilizing labor relations.  
 Nonetheless, it is important to emphasize that this experimentation takes place 
within clearly demarcated political boundaries. First, and probably most importantly, is 
that workers do not enjoy freedom of association. Thus, employees are still confined by 
the conservative and generally ineffectual ACFTU, which remains subordinate to 
management within the firm. Second, there is no right to strike. Under such conditions, 
employers have little incentive to take negotiations seriously, and there is plenty of 
evidence to suggest that little substantive bargaining occurs. Of course strikes do happen 
all the time – but typically workers must strike simply in order to get management to the 
table. Third, any kind of cross-enterprise organization that involves workers is likely to 
be shut down by the government for fear of fomenting social instability. Given these 
constraints, efforts by the state and union to institutionalize robust labor relations will 
                                                        
9 August 18, 2010. “Foxconn rallies China workers amid suicide concerns.” BBC.  
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continue to face major challenges – and indeed, wildcat strikes are often still the most 
effective way for workers to have their grievances addressed.   
 Finally, we would like to reemphasize and problematize countervailing trends 
towards increased centralization. In a number of industries and regions around the 
country, the state and union appear to be moving away from the extreme 
individualization that characterized most of the 1990s and 2000s. Even if collective 
negotiations are expanding only at the enterprise level, this represents an increase in 
centralization over the purely individual bargaining of the laissez faire labor market. 
These tendencies might, somewhat awkwardly, be thought of as “decentralized 
centralization” in the sense that this centralization rarely extends beyond the enterprise or 
municipality. Inevitably, movements towards centralization will bump up against the 
state’s political concerns about interest coordination and aggregation. In this sense, we 
see an emergent tension between the imperatives to institutionalize an effective system of 
labor relations on the one hand, and the state’s political commitment to atomization of 
society on the other.  
 The papers in this special issue represent starting points for a number of 
promising avenues of research inquiry. First, we are in need of more comprehensive 
studies of legal enforcement and implementation. Especially important here would be 
regional and sectoral comparisons, such that we have a clearer understanding of how 
national level legislation is instantiated in a variety of contexts. Second, studies of 
turnover could help clarify how managers and local governments have responded to 
persistent labor shortages. We do not have a solid understanding as to why China has 
such high levels of labor turnover, or what sorts of approaches might stabilize the 
workforce (short of unfree labor). Third, how have changes in the dynamics of labor 
protest affected labor relations? Will increased interest-based demands as well as non-
wage demands result in more substantive collective negotiations? Finally, and we believe 
this is applicable to all the above, what are the implications for labor relations of the 
massive inland movement of labor and capital? How will social, economic, and political 
conditions in China’s central and western provinces impact the development of labor 
relations? This will likely be the major story over the next decade, and thus far we are 
sorely lacking in strong empirical analyses of this new frontier.  Looking further into the 
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future, we will need research that examines the effect on labor markets and labor 
relations of a number of recently announced proposals including changes to the birth 
control policy, reforms to the hukou system for smaller and medium sized cities, and a 
rise in the retirement age. Regardless of the outcomes, we anticipate that experiments 
with labor relations frameworks will continue to proceed in a largely decentralized 
manner.  
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